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I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Legislature amended the state's stalking statute last
May,' establishing stalking as a general intent crime in Minnesota.2 The
legislature also removed the objective "reasonable person" standard from
the definition of the crime that gauged stalking activity's impact on a vic-
tim.3 The amended statute requires that a stalker know his or her conduct
4
would cause a victim to feel intimidated or oppressed.
This Comment will illustrate that Minnesota's amended stalking stat-
1. See Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, §§ 6-9, 1997 Minn. Laws 700 (amending
Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (1996)).
2. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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ute is unconstitutionally vague. In doing so, it will briefly document the
development of stalking law in the United States generally5 and in Minne-
sota specifically.6 It will then demonstrate that the amendment establish-
ing stalking as a general intent crime does not render the statute uncon-
stitutional and is the standard necessary to ensure all stalking activity is
7
brought within its scope. However, the legislature's removal of the rea-
sonable person standard, read in light of other jurisdictions' rulings on8
stalking statutes, renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. In addi-
tion, its subjective element in the definition of the crime may, defacto, ne-
gate the provision establishing stalking as a general intent crime by intro-
ducing language denoting specific intent as an element of this crime,
rendering the statute ambiguous.9
II. HISTORY OF STALKING LAW
A. History and Development of Stalking Law in the United States
California passed the nation's first stalking legislation in 1990.'
°
Since then, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted stalk-11 12
ing statutes. While there is no widely accepted definition of stalking,
5. See infra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 101-28 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Supp. 1998). The statute defined stalking as
repeatedly, willfully, and maliciously following or harassing another person. Id.
11. ALA. CODE §§ 13-A-6-90 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.260,.270 (Michie
1996), ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229
(1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111
(1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-181c-182d (1994); D.C. STAT. § 22.504 (1996);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11.1312A (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048 (Supp. 1998); GA.
CODEANN. § 16-5-90-92 (1996); HAw. Rrv. STAT. 711-1106.5 (1994); IDAHO CODE §
18-7905 (1997); ILL. REV. STAT. 5/12-7.3, .4 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-5
(West 1997); IOWA CODE § 708.11 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3438 (1995); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. 508.130, .140, .150 (Michie 1996); LA. STAT. ANN. 14:40.2 (West
1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 17-A § 210-A (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN. §
121B (1996); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i (1997); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (Supp. 1997); MIss.
CODE ANN. 97-3-107 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.255 (West Supp. 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-311.02-05 (Michie 1996);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.575 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2C: 12-10 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-1 to -4 (1994); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.25-.26 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-17-07.1 (1997); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.211
(1996); OELA. STAT. tit 21 § 1173 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.732
(1996); PA. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-59-1 to -3 (1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-19A-1
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the term brings to mind a wide range of harassing behaviors that frighten
or terrorize a victim.13
The response by legislatures in enacting stalking statutes has been at-
tributed to two factors. The first is recognition that stalking is a wide-
spread, serious problem in the United States. It is documented that14
200,000 people in the United States stalk someone each year. Stalking
activity is not limited to former spouses or partners, having extended to
incidents where the stalker has had little or no previous contact with his or• . 15 .. .
her victim. The impact on stalking victims is substantial, and many are
forced to alter their lives drastically. Second, since stalking behavior is
manifested by pursuit or harassment of the victim, rather than by actual
attack, stalking victims had to wait and hope their stalker would not actu-
(Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (1997); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
42.07 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §
1061-1063 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A. 46.110 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1996); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 947.013 (West 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (Michie 1996).
12. See M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or
Overbroad?88 Nw. U. L. REv. 769, 774 (1994). Stalking statutes vary greatly in how
they define the crime and defy easy classification. See id. See also Robert P. Faulk-
ner & Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of An-
tistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5 (1994)
(asserting that there is no precise definition of stalking behavior).
13. See Ellen F. Sohn, Antistalking Statutes: Do They Really Protect Victims?, 30
CRIM. L. BULL. 203, 205 (1994). "The stalker follows his or her victim, spies on
them, and perhaps makes threats." Id. See also Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., Note,
From Impudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 819, 831
(1993). Stalkers make repeated efforts to contact their victims by phone or letter,
send gifts, attempt visits, and undertake surveillance. See id.
14. See Sohn, supra note 13, at 205. Five percent of women in the general
population will be victims of stalking in their lives. See id. See also Faulkner &
Hsiao, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that there are an estimated 200,000 stalkers in
the United States).
15. See Matthew J. Gilligan, Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to Thwart
Those Who Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L. REv. 285, 286 n.9 (1992). Statements in the
Congressional Record note the nationwide proliferation of stalking-related do-
mestic violence as well as increased incidents of stalking by complete strangers as major
impetuses for establishing stalking statutes. See id. (emphasis added.) See also
Faulkner & Hsiao, supra note 12, at 5. Stalkers can be obsessed fans, divorced or
separated spouses, ex-lovers, rejected suitors, neighbors, coworkers, classmates,
gang members, former employees, or complete strangers. See id.
16. See Beth Bjerregaard, Stalking and the First Amendment: A Constitutional
Analysis of State Stalking Laws, 32 CRIM. L. BuLL. 307, 309 (1996 ) (detailing that
stalking victims are forced to change their phone numbers and even their resi-
dences.); see also People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995) (stalking victim moved to her father's home, lost her job because co-workers
were "afraid" of her stalker, and changed her phone number, only to have her
stalker obtain her new number within one week); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d
666, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stalking victim forced to move four times, only to
have stalker find her).
1998]
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ally follow through with threats or go beyond mere pursuit, 7 because po-
lice are unable to arrest an individual for a crime not yet committed."'
Legislatures responded to the concern that the legal system provided no
remedy' 9 or insufficient remedies for this crime. Stalking legislation fills
this void in the legal system, granting victims sufficient remedies to end
their fears or prevent their deaths by allowing law enforcement officers to21
intercede before violence occurs. One state court asserted that effective
stalking legislation is part of a state's "social contract" with its citizens.2
At least twenty-seven jurisdictions' appellate courts have ruled on the
constitutionality of their states' stalking statutes against vagueness and/or
overbreadth challenges. Twenty-four have been upheld against constitu-
tional attack23 and three have been invalidated as unconstitutionally
17. See Sohn, supra note 13, at 205.
18. See id. at 207.
19. See generally Gilligan, supra note 15, at 295-99 nn. 66-88 and accompany-
ing text(asserting that assault statutes fail to provide a remedy because a stalker
may never commit an overt act sufficient to raise a fear of immediate bodily harm
as required by assault statutes); see also id. at note 79 (citing a Congressional
statement by Senator Cohen regarding a stalker who, after stalking girl for 19
months without committing an overt act, suddenly kidnapped, raped and mur-
dered her. Police had taken no action because prior to the kidnapping, the
stalker had committed no overt act that constituted a crime).
20. See Karen A. Brooks, The New Stalking Laws: Are They Adequate to End Vio-
lence?, 14 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 259, 259 (1993). "In the year preceding the
passage of the law, five California women were murdered by men they knew. Re-
straining orders issued to protect these women from their stalkers proved ineffec-
tive." Id. See also Sohn, supra note 13, at 208. Protective orders are ineffective be-
cause a victim will still have to wait in fear before police can prosecute a violation
of the order. See id. Because these orders are specific, a stalker can avoid a viola-
tion by altering his or her behavior to avoid the literal language of the order. See
id. Procedural requirements for obtaining these orders are complex and expen-
sive, discouraging victims from seeking them. See id. Further, many victims realize
waiving a piece of paper in front of a stalker is of little value and may serve only to
aggravate the stalker. See id. at 209.
21. See Brooks, supra note 20, at 259-60 (emphasis added).
22. See State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 101-02 (Conn. Super. 1993). The Con-
necticut Superior Court stated that the state's interest in criminalizing stalking is
to protect citizens from the consequences of stalking behavior. See id. The court
went on to state that criminalizing stalking provides law enforcement authorities
with a means for intervening in stalking situations early on, before the behavior can
escalate into something more serious, including physical assault. See id. Finally, the
court added that providing protection from stalking conduct is at the heart of the
state's "social contract" with its citizens, and that the freedom to go about one's
daily business is "hollow" if one's piece of mind is being destroyed, or his or her
safety endangered by the threatening presence of an unwanted pursuer. See id.
23. See Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d 156, 159-64 (Ala. Ct. App. 1995); Pe-
tersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 424-39 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); People v. Heilman, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 421, 427-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Culmo, 642 A.2d at 100; Snowden v.
State, 677 A.2d 33, 36-37 (Del. 1996); United States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 388
(D.C. 1996); Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358, 1361 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994);Johnson v.
[Vol. 24
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24
vague. These decisions will be analyzed in light of Minnesota's statute in
Part IV.
B. Minnesota's Stalking Law
The Minnesota Legislature criminalized stalking in 1993.25 The stat-
ute defined stalking as "engag[ing] in intentional conduct in a manner
that would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to feel op-
pressed, persecuted, or intimidated."W3 The legislature was motivated in
drafting this legislation by violent stalking incidents similar to those that
had occurred nationwide. Also reflecting national trends, the legislature
acknowledged that existing criminal statutes in Minnesota did not ade-
quately protect stalking victims.28
State, 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1994); People v. Holt 649 N.E.2d 571, 580 (I11. App.
Ct. 1995);Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. App. 1995); Monhollen v.
Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); People v. White, 536
N.W.2d 876, 883-84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14, 19-20
(Mont. 1995); State v. Saunders, 695 A.2d 722, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997); State v. Benner, 644 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (Ohio App. 1994); State v. Saun-
ders 886 P.2d 496, 497-98 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Rangel, 934 P.2d 1128,
1132 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Com. v. Schierscher 668 A.2d 164, 172 (Pa. 1995); State
v. Fonseca 670 A.2d 1237, 1240 (R.I. 1996); State v. McGill, 536 N.W.2d 89, 95-96
(S.D. 1995); Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530, 535-37 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Lee 917 P.2d 159, 167-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); Luplow v. State 897 P.2d 463,
472 (Wyo. 1995).
24. State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 220-21 (Kan. 1996); Commonwealth. v.
Kwiatowski, 637 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Mass. 1994); Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 296-
97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
25. Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 326, art. 2, § 22, 1993 Minn. Laws 2010 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (1994)). Minnesota's anti-stalking statute defined harass
as "engag[ing] in intentional conduct in a manner that.., would cause a reason-
able person under the circumstances to feel oppressed, persecuted, or intimi-
dated.., and causes this reaction on the part of the victim." Id.
26. MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subd. 1 (1994).
27. See Cassandra Ward, Minnesota's Anti-Stalking Statute: A Durable Tool to Pro-
tect Victims from Terroristic Behavior, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 613, 633-34 (1994) (detailing
incidents, two of which resulted in murder, cited by proponents of Minnesota's
anti-stalking legislation as evidence of the state's need for such laws).
28. See generally Ward, supra note 27, at 621-31 and accompanying text. Min-
nesota's Domestic Abuse Act is limited only to those related by blood or marriage.
See id. A victim also is unprotected after a temporary restraining order expires,
and penalties for violating a valid restraining order are minimal. See id. Assault
statutes are ineffective until a stalker violently attacks or attempts to attack his or
her victim. See id. Trespass statutes are ineffective for stalking activities that take
place away from the victim's home. See id. Terroristic threat statutes are ineffec-
tive against a stalker who merely says words such as "I love you" or "You belong to
me." See id. Public nuisance statutes are geared more toward privacy concerns
than to the harm stalkers inflict on their victims. See id. Harassment statutes do
no more than increase the penalties for actions proscribed by trespass, assault,
1998]
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has not ruled conclusively on29
whether the stalking statute is vague. In State v. Orsello, the Minnesota
Supreme court skirted the appellant's vagueness argument by stating that
the issue of the case was whether or not the stalking statute defined a
crime of general or specific intent. The court held that Minnesota's
stalking statute defined a specific rather than general intent crime.3 1
Although not necessary to its holding, the court briefly addressed the
constitutionality of the statute, declaring that if it held that the stalking
statute required only general intent, it "might be void for vagueness and
thus, unconstitutional" for failing to provide sufficient notice to the public
of what conduct is prohibited. The court did not resolve this constitu-
tional concern, declaring instead that it merely "buttressed" its decision
that the statute required specific intent.3
and Terroristic threat statutes. See id.
29. See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 1996) (stating "[w]hile we
do not base our decision on any resolution of this constitutional issue, it does but-
tress our statutory analysis."). The Minnesota Supreme Court has, however, con-
clusively ruled that a portion of Minnesota's stalking statute is overbroad. See
State v. Machholz, No. CX-96-1865, 1998 WL 19751, at *6 (Minn. 1998). In Mach-
hol., the appellant rode his horse through a group of people who had gathered to
celebrate National Coming Out Day and shouted "'You're giving us AIDS!; You're
spreading your filth!; There are no homosexuals in heaven!; and You're corrupt-
ing our children!'" Id. at *1. Appellant was charged with felony harassment in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subds. 1(1), 2(7), and 3(1). See id. The su-
preme court ultimately dismissed the charges against Machholz holding that the
words used in Minnesota's stalking statute namely, "engag[ing] in any other har-
assing conduct that interferes with another person or intrudes on the person's
privacy or liberty," violate the First Amendment's right to expressive activity and
are therefore overbroad. See id. at *4-6. The court was careful to note that it did
not reach the appellant's vagueness challenge and that the "decision in Orsello was
based on its interpretation of the statute, not on any resolution of a vagueness
challenge." Id. at *6 n.3. The court further noted that "the defendant in Orsello
was not charged under subdivision 2(7), the particular subdivision at issue [in
Machholz]." Id.
30. See Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 72.
31. See id. at 76. Despite the court's express recognition that the statute con-
tained none of the statutorily specified language used to create a specific intent
crime in Minnesota, it determined that the intent level required by the statute
was "ambiguous." See id. at 74. The court therefore embarked on a search for leg-
islative intent mentioning, in dicta, the rule of lenity which requires that ambigu-
ous criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of the defendant; in Orsello, lenity
required specific intent. See id.
32. See id. at 76-77 (citing cases from two other jurisdictions where courts
have upheld stalking statutes where specific intent is an element of the crime).
33. See id. at 77. The supreme court did not raise the issue of overbreadth in
Orsello, so the topic is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it does merit
brief attention because the two doctrines are generally addressed together, par-
ticularly when stalking statutes are challenged. The overbreadth doctrine serves
to invalidate legislation so sweeping that it restricts constitutionally-protected
rights of free speech, press, or assembly. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
[Vol. 24
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In response to the court's ruling, and at the court's invitation,34 the
Minnesota Legislature enacted a "clarifying" amendment that the statute
requires only general intent.35  It also amended the definition of the
crime, displacing the objective reasonable person standard with a more
subjective standard requiring that a stalker know his or her conduct in-
616 (1971). The United States Supreme Court in Broadrick v. State, 413 U.S. 601,
613 (1973), set limitations on the invocation of the overbreadth doctrine where
conduct and not merely speech is involved, declaring that this doctrine is "strong
medicine," to be employed "with hesitation," and "only as a last resort." Where
conduct is regulated, a statute which has constitutional applications may be fa-
cially invalidated only if its overbreadth is "substantial judged in relation to the stat-
ute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615 (emphasis added). These factors are
prominent in decisions upholding stalking statutes against overbreadth chal-
lenges. See State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14, 20 (Mont. 1995) (holding that it is con-
duct, and not merely speech, which is proscribed by the statute; statute serves a
plainly legitimate purpose); State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 101-04 (Conn. Super.
1993) (holding that state's interest in criminalizing stalking was compelling; stat-
ute regulates conduct); Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358, 1364 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994)
(ruling that the word "follows" in stalking statute was directed primarily at con-
duct, not First Amendment expression); State v. Bilder, 651 N.E.2d 502, 509
(Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1994) (finding statute was aimed at prohibiting harmful con-
duct; reflects legitimate state interest).
Subdivision 7 of Minnesota's stalking statute is another factor which miti-
gates against a constitutional overbreadth attack. Subdivision 7 provides:
Conduct is not a crime under this section if it is performed under terms
of a valid license, to ensure compliance with a court order, or to carry
out a specific lawful commercial purpose or employment duty, is author-
ized or required by a valid contract, or is authorized, required, or pro-
tected by state or federal law or the state or federal constitutions. Subdi-
vision 2, clause (2) does not impair the right of any individual or group
to engage in speech protected by the federal constitution, or federal or
state law, including peaceful and lawful handbilling and picketing.
MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 7 (1996).
Courts upholding stalking statutes against overbreadth challenges have de-
termined similar provisions to mitigate against a statute's propensity to infringe
on constitutionally protected behavior. See, e.g., Holt, 649 N.E.2d at 581
(recognizing that Illinois' statute specifically exempts conduct protected by the
first amendment such as lawful picketing or any exercise of free speech or assem-
bly that is otherwise lawful); Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d 156, 161 (Ala. Ct. App.
1995) (noting that statute specifically declares that "[c]onstitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct'"). The court in
State v. Machholz mentioned MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 7 without applying it to
the facts of the case. See 1998 WL 19751, at * 2; see also supra note 29.
34. See Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 77. The court posited that if the legislature
truly meant for stalking to be a general intent crime, it possessed the means "to
ameliorate the statute's present lack of precision by a clarifying amendment." Id.
35. See Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, §§ 6-9, 1997 Minn. Laws 700 (amending
Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (1996)). In a prosecution under this section, the state is not
required to prove that the actor intended to cause the victim to feel frightened,
threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated. See id.
1998]
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timidates or oppresses a victim.3
III. THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
A. The Elements of Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine garners its force from the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which focus on notice
37
and enforcement. For notice, the doctrine requires that statutes give to a
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so they may act accordingly.38 If a statute does not clearly de-39
fine the conduct prohibited, it is unconstitutionally vague. For enforce-
ment, the vagueness doctrine requires that laws provide explicit standards
for those who apply them to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement. The United States Supreme Court declared that the more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement officials.
A third, related aspect of the vagueness doctrine ensures that a stat-
42
ute does not infringe upon basic First Amendment freedoms. This as-
pect of the vagueness doctrine is based on the concern that "[u] ncertain
meanings lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone... than if
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
43
36. See id. The new statute defines stalking as engaging in "intentional con-
duct which: (1) the actor knows or has reason to know would cause the victim under the
circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimi-
dated." Id. at subd. 1(1) (emphasis added). Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.749(1)
(1996). Harass means to engage in intentional conduct in a manner that: (1)
would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to feel oppressed, persecuted,
or intimidated (emphasis added). Id.
37. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV.
38. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also State v.
Miner, 556 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Grayned).
39. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
40. See id.; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1982). Where a leg-
islature fails to provide minimal guidelines for enforcement, a criminal statute
may permit "a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries
to pursue their personal predilections." Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 575 (1974)).
41. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; see also State v. Machholz, 561 N.W.2d 198,
200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), reversed on other grounds, No. CX-96-1865, 1998 WL
19751 (Minn.Jan. 22, 1998) (citing Kolender, recognizing that the more important
aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine was the requirement of guidelines to
prevent arbitrary enforcement.)
42. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
43. Id.
[Vol. 24
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B. Applications of the Vagueness Doctrine
The threshold matter in applying the vagueness doctrine is whether
the statute inhibits First Amendment freedoms. If a statute threatens to
inhibit constitutionally protected rights, a more stringent vagueness test is
applied.45  If a statute contains limiting elements that remove First
Amendment concerns from consideration, a statute can be evaluated un-
der less exacting due process standards.4
Courts examining statutes under attack for vagueness recognize two
factors legislatures face in drafting criminal statutes. The first factor is the
inherent constraints language imposes on legislatures when defining
crimes. Courts do not require meticulous specificity or expect mathe-
matical certainty from language. The second factor concerns the balanc-
ing process a legislature undertakes when drafting criminal statutes. This
process weighs effectiveness against constitutional infirmity. If the statute
is too narrowly drawn, "the risk is nullification by easy evasion of the legis-
lative purpose.... If the statute is drafted with great generality, the risk is
unconstitutional ensnarement of innocent, constitutionally protected
conduct."48 Because of these factors, only a reasonable degree of certainty
is demanded.49
The four elements most carefully scrutinized in decisions interpret-
ing stalking statutes under vagueness challenges are: 1) the intent re-
quired; 2) an act requirement; 3) an objective standard for interpreting
44. SeeVillage of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 494-95, 499. If a statute does not implicate any constitutional
activity, a court should invalidate the statute only if it is vague in all of its applica-
tions. See id. at 494-95. If Constitutional freedoms are removed from the statute's
scope, an individual "who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." Id. at
495. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). "[S]tatutes which
do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the
facts in the case at hand." Id.
47. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.
48. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31, at 1033 (2d
ed. 1988). This concern weighed heavily on the minds of legislators professing
the need for stalking legislation. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 27, at 615. U.S. Sena-
tor William Cohen introduced a bill to assist states in developing stalking legisla-
tion. See id. His motivation in doing so grew out of a concern "that states would
draft legislation too narrowly, rendering them essentially meaningless, or too
broadly, making them unconstitutional." Id.
49. See Boyce Motor Lines Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a
principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical
difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into
account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide
fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
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the crime's effect on a victim; and 4) actual harm or effect on the victim.50
None of these factors is dispositive, nor are all addressed in every decision
interpreting stalking statutes for vagueness.
IV. VAGUENESS AND MINNESOTA'S STALKING STATUTE
The following analysis will demonstrate that Minnesota's amended
stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague for reasons apart from those
suggested in the Orsello dicta. Part IV-(A) will establish that the legisla-
ture's amendment making stalking a general intent crime is not fatal, as
suggested by the court in Orsello. While most stalking statutes require
specific intent, specific intent does not automatically validate an otherwise
vague statute. This is evidenced by the fact that specific intent stalking
statutes have been held unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, by incorpo-
rating a narrowly drawn act requirement, the Minnesota statute provides a
person of ordinary intelligence an opportunity to know what is prohibited
and provides explicit standards that prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. 3 Finally, general intent statutes have been upheld against
vagueness challenges.54
Although the statute is not unconstitutional because of its general in-
tent requirement, Part IV-(B) (1) will reveal that the legislature's amend-
ment removing the "reasonable person" standard from the definition of
the crime renders the statute vague. This is so because the resulting sub-
jective standard brings within the statute's scope constitutionally protected
activity55 and is repugnant to the due process vagueness concerns regard-
ing notice and enforcement.56 Part IV-(B) (2) proposes that the new defi-
nition of the crime requiring that a stalker know that his or her conduct
would intimidate or harass the victim may have defeated the legislature's
purpose in establishing stalking as a general intent crime. The clause in-
troduces ambiguity into the definition of the crime regarding the mental
element requiredY.
50. See generally Bjerregaard, supra note 16, at 334-41 (listing all stalking stat-
utes and identifying the "limiting elements" in the statutes). A few statutes also
require a "threat" be communicated as an element of the crime. See Boychuk su-
pra note 12, at 778. Most states do not include a threat requirement in their stalk-
ing statutes, however, because it makes the statute much more difficult to enforce.
Id. at 779 (listing states that removed the threat requirement from their stalking
laws as originally enacted). Minnesota's statute does not contain a threat re-
quirement as an element of the crime.
51. See Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 76.
52. See infra notes 61-65.
53. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 38, 40
and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 79-84.
55. See infra notes 101-113 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
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A. The Intent Element in Stalking Statutes: Is General Intent
Unconstitutional?
In its brief discussion addressing the constitutionality of Minnesota's
stalking statute, the supreme court in Orsello observed that most stalking
statutes surviving vagueness challenges have included specific intent as an
element of the crime. Of the twenty-seven statutes challenied for
vagueness or overbreadth, twenty-four are specific intent statutes. Spe-
cific intent, however, does not guarantee that a statute provides sufficient
notice of prohibited conduct, nor does it ensure a statute provides ade-
quate guidance for those charged with enforcing it. Furthermore, Alaska,
Michigan, and Washington have general intent stalking statutes that have
been upheld against vagueness challenges.60
1. Specific Intent Statutes Held Unconstitutional
Two of the three reported decisions holding stalking statutes uncon-
58. See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 1996); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 3.5(e), at 315
(1986). Specific intent designates "a special mental element which is required
above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the [act] of the
crime." Id. For example, "burglary requires a breaking and entry into the dwell-
ing of another, but in addition to the mental state connected with these acts it
must also be established that the defendant acted with 'intent to commit a felony
therein.'" Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 8.13(e)(1962)). This was the stan-
dard employed by the court in Orsello. See Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 72. Specific in-
tent requires that the defendant acted with the intention to produce a specific
result. See id. (emphasis in original). Conversely, general intent requires only that
a defendant engaged intentionally in prohibited conduct. See id.
59. These statutes establish specific intent as an element of the crime vari-
ously, with language such as: "with intent to cause .... " See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13-
A-6-90(a) (Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (Supp. 1998). Other statues
use the language "purposefully or knowingly causes .... " See MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-5-220 (1) (1996). The Georgia code uses the language "for the purpose of har-
assing .... " See GA. CODEANN. § 16-5-90(a) (1996). Oklahoma requires that one
"willfully, maliciously follow[] or harass...." See OKLA. STAT. § 1173(a) (Supp.
1998). Other states use the language of "knowing(ly) cause...." See, e.g., OHIO
REv. CODE § 2903.211(A) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(2)(a) (1995).
Some decisions upholding a statute's constitutionality assert that specific intent
negates a stalker's contention that a statute is vague. See, e.g., Culbreath, 667 So. 2d
at 159 (declaring that where a stalker has specific intent to bring about a particu-
lar effect, he or she is presumed to be on notice that his or her actions constitute
a crime); People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(asserting that specific intent defeats the argument that law enforcement would
unfairly apply a law). Some statutes do not expressly incorporate specific intent
but have nevertheless had that element imputed by courts. See infra note 131.
60. See Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 418 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); People v.
White, 536 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Lee, 917 P.2d 159, 166
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996). See also infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
1998]
11
McMahon: Constitutional Law—Unreasonable Ambiguity: Minnesota'S Amended St
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
stitutional dealt with statutes that contained a specific intent element. In
Commonwealth v. Kwiatowski,61 the Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court
held that state's stalking statute unconstitutional despite a specific intent
element. The court declared that the uncertain meaning of "repeated pat-
terns of conduct" or "repeated series of acts" rendered the statute vague
for "lacking any discernible unambiguous application," thereby failing to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is for-
bidden.6 2 In Long v. State,6 3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
state's stalking statute unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that the specific
intent element did not solve the vagueness of the underlying conduct
criminalized by the vague terms "annoy" and "alarm. "6 4 These decisions
demonstrate that a statute merely requiring someone to specifically intend
to harass, without defining the terms or conduct proscribed, may still be
65
vague.
Rather than an absolute cure for constitutional infirmity, specific in-
tent merely affords statutes under vagueness attack the benefit of less
strenuous scrutiny. In State v. Saunders, the Superior Court of New Jersey
held that the defendant's claim that that state's stalking statute was vague
failed "because the statute requires specific intent."6 The court reasoned
that the specific intent required modz/ied any phrases that could possibly be
deemed vague, so that they were not vague. In People v. Heilman, the court de-
clared that it was the stalker's intent, rather than the definition of the
conduct engaged in, which triggered the applicability of the statute, add-
ing that specific intent may validate an otherwise vague or indefinite statute.68
Two other decisions upholding specific intent statutes further exem-
plify courts' relaxed attitude in examining the conduct criminalized in
statutes under vagueness challenges if specific intent is an element of the
crime. Like the statute ruled unconstitutional in Long,69 these statutes de-
fined the underlying conduct loosely with poorly drafted "act" require-
61. 637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass 1994).
62. Id. at 857. The court held that the statute's definition of "harasses" ren-
dered the statute vague for requiring a repetition of either a pattern of conduct
or a series of acts. See id. The court reasoned that a single pattern of conduct or a
single series of acts was presumably intended by the legislature. See id.
63. 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
64. Id. at 289. The court listed other provisions that rendered the statute
unconstitutional as well, including its lack of a reasonable person standard for in-
terpreting the effect of the conduct on a victim. See id. This concern is addressed
in Part IV(B) (2), infra (asserting that the lack of a reasonable person standard in
Minnesota's statute renders the statute vague).
65. See Boychuk, supra note 12, at 796.
66. See State v. Saunders, 695 A.2d 722, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
67. Id. (emphasis in text added); see also Boychuk, supra note 12, at 796
(declaring that courts generally look more favorably on laws that require specific
intent).
68. People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
69. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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ments. In State v. Culmo, the Superior Court of Connecticut held that spe-
cific intent "significantly vitiates" a claim that a statute's purported vague-
ness would mislead a person of common intelligence into misunderstand-
ing what conduct is prohibited. 70 The court declared that "Iilt is not
necessary that a statute list the precise actions prohibited by it to survive a
vagueness attack."71 The Indiana Court of Appeals expressed a similar
view in Johnson v. State when it upheld that state's specific intent statute,
proclaiming that a statute need not list in detail each type of conduct pro-
hibited.72
2. Minnesota's Narrowly Drawn Act Requirement
In stark contrast, Minnesota's stalking statute has a definitive, nar-
73rowly drawn act requirement, listing which "acts" constitute stalking.
Commentators have asserted that a narrowly defined act requirement,
even without specific intent, satisfies vagueness concerns. Listing the
acts that constitute stalking mitigates against arbitrary enforcement; be-
cause the acts prohibited are set out by list, the discretion of law enforce-
ment officers is limited.75 Listing specific acts also puts an average person
on notice of what conduct is prohibited by the statute. In Peterson v.
State, the Alaska Court of Appeals noted the general intent statute's
"limiting definition of the phrase 'course of conduct,'" augmented by a list
of acts constituting stalking, in denying the defendant's vagueness chal-
70. See State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 98 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
71. See id. at 97 (quoting State v. Eason 470 A.2d 688, 693 (Conn. 1984)).
72. SeeJohnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. App. 1995).
73. See MwN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 2 (West 1997). The statue identifies the
following acts as "stalking":
(1) directly or indirectly manifests a purpose or intent to injure the per-
son, property, or rights of another by the commission of an unlawful act;
(2) stalks, follows, or pursues another; (3) returns to the property of an-
other if the actor is without claim of right to the property or consent of
one with authority to consent; (4) repeatedly makes telephone calls, or
induces a victim to make telephone calls to the actor, whether or not a
conversation ensues; (5) makes or causes the telephone of another re-
peatedly or continuously to ring; (6) repeatedly uses the mail or delivers
or cases the delivery of letters, telegrams, packages, or other objects, or
(7) engages in any other harassing conduct that interferes with another
person or intrudes on the person's privacy or liberty.
Id.
74. See Faulkner & Hsiao, supra note 12, at 51.
75. See Ward, supra note 27, at 640-41 (asserting that where acts are listed
there is not much room for subjective interpretation by those who enforce the
law). See also supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that the more impor-
tant aspect of the vagueness doctrine is the requirement that a legislature estab-
lish guidelines to govern law enforcement).
76. See id. at 641 (listing the acts that constitute stalking ensures the average
citizen understands what actions are prohibited).
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77 ~78
lenge, asserting that "this conduct, by itself, constituted stalking."  Like
Alaska's statue, Minnesota's stalking statute embodies such a narrowly
drawn act definition and helps overcome any vagueness concerns flowing
from its general intent requirement.
3. General Intent Statutes Held Constitutional
Further negating the notion that specific intent is required for a
stalking statute to withstand a constitutional attack is the fact that stalking
statutes requiring only general intent have been upheld against vagueness• v 80 • 81
attacks. Alaska, Michigan, and Washington have general intent stalk-
ing statutes that have been held constitutional. In State v. Lee, the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals specifically rejected the defendant's contention
that the statute was vague for not requiring that the defendant act with a
specific intent to cause harm, holding that the absence of a specific intent
82
element did not render the statute vague. In People v. White, the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that his con-
duct was the result of his relationship with his victim and not the result of
83
any criminal intent. The court held that the statute prohibited uncon-
sented contact with a victim regardless of his romantic intentions.84
The White decision highlights the policy reason why general, rather
than specific intent, should be the standard in stalking statutes. On a
practical level, requiring specific intent as an element of stalking fails to
recognize that many stalkers do not intend to hurt or frighten their vic-83 .. 86
tim. A significant portion of stalkers have some type of mental illness,
77. Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 423-24 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
78. Id. at 424
79. See id.
80. See People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
81. See State v. Lee, 917 P.2d 159, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
82. 917 P.2d at 167. "The conduct proscribed by the statute is clear: One
may not follow another person in such a way as to cause the person to experience
a reasonable sense of fear." Id.
83. See White, 536 N.W.2d at 883.
84. See id. at 883-84.
85. See Brooks; supra note 20, at 274. Many stalkers are obsessed with their
victims at a level of mental disturbance and wish only to express love or affection
to their victims. See id. See also Sohn, supra note 13, at 220. The largest hindrance
to enforcement of stalking statutes occurs where stalking is a specific intent crime.
See id. Considering the type of behavior in question, a specific intent requirement
may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle in many cases because many stalkers
do not intend to hurt or frighten their victim. See id. at 221. If specific intent is
required, it is not sufficient that the victim is actually fearful or intimidated. See id.
at 220. See also infra note 87 (detailing the psychological profiles of stalkers to
demonstrate the impracticality of a specific intent requirement in these crimes).
86.See Bjerregaard, supra note 16, at 308. Several jurisdictions, including
Minnesota, have implicitly recognized stalkers are acting under some sort of men-
tal hindrance by incorporating provisions in their stalking statutes calling for a
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an assertion supported by current psychological, psychiatric, and forensic
87
literature. Therefore, to require that a stalker specifically intend to op-
mental health assessment for people convicted of stalking. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
IAws ANN. § 750.411h(3) (c) (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PEN. CODE § 646.9(1) (West
Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 6 (Supp. 1998). Minnesota's stalking
statute reads:
When a person is convicted of a felony offense under this section, or an-
other felony offense arising out of a charge based on this section, the
court shall order an independent professional mental health assessment
of the offender's need for mental health treatment. The court may waive
the assessment if an adequate assessment was conducted prior to the
conviction.
MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 6 (1996).
87. See McAnaney, supra note 13, at 831. Current psychological literature
identifies four stalker profiles See id. Three of these stalker profiles, the delu-
sional erotomaniac, the borderline erotomaniac, and the former intimate stalker
suggest specific intent is impractical, while a fourth type of stalker profile, the so-
ciopathic stalker, is not eliminated from a statute's scope by a specific intent re-
quirement, because the Sociopathic Stalker clearly and specifically intends to in-
timidate his or her victim. See id.
The first type of stalker, the Delusional Erotomaniac truly believes he or she
is loved by another individual and intends to establish an intimate, even permanent,
relationship with the object of his or her fantasy. See id. at 833 (emphasis added).
This stalker believes his or her role as suitor is warranted and that his or her target
reciprocates an intensity of emotion and desire for union despite the absence of
any actual relationship or emotional reciprocity. See id. at 833-34. To require that
this type of stalker specifically intend to "oppress, persecute or intimidate" the ob-
ject of his or her fantasy is absurd.
The second type of stalker, the Borderline Erotomaniac, develops intense
emotional feelings, often as a result of trivial contact such as an innocuous glance.
See id. at 836. These stalkers vacillate between attitudes of love and hate towards
other individuals who they know do not reciprocate their feelings. See id. at 835. This
stalker feels abandoned and rejected when his or her feelings are not recipro-
cated. See id. at 837. He or she acts out of "clingy desperation" to win the others'
affection, intending to fill a void or keep from being abandoned. See id. at 836 (emphasis
added). Requiring a person so disturbed so as to be easily enticed into a relation-
ship that never existed, who acts out of desperation to fill a void, to specifically
intend to persecute his or her victim is also unreasonable.
The third type of stalker, the Former Intimate Stalker, has had an intimate
relationship with their target and refuses to be rejected. See id. at 839. The For-
mer Intimate is intensely emotionally dependent, may experience feelings ofjeal-
ousy, and exhibit a significant need to control their former partner. See id. at 839-
41. In many cases, these stalkers have a prior history of abusive relationships and
many of these cases result in assault and even death. See id. at 839. Former Inti-
mates regard their targets as personal possessions that can be treated as such, and
their propensity to apply force to exert control or domination over their victims is
widely accepted by clinicians. See id. at 841. It is less unreasonable to require spe-
cific intent of this stalker. However, because he or she is more violence-prone,
and considering stalking statutes are intended to prevent harassing behavior be-
fore it escalates to violence, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, requiring
general intent seems most logical. The former intimate stalker may claim his or
her intentions were merely those of a loving spouse or partner expressing feel-
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press, persecute, or intimidate, as the court did in Orsello, renders stalking
statutes underinclusive and inapplicable in many circumstances.ss
It is illustrative to examine the circumstances in which one of the
cases cited in Orsello applied that state's specific intent stalking statute. In
Heilman, the California Court of Appeal applied that state's statute in a
situation where the stalker had threatened his victim with, among other
things, a note which read, "I'm going to make your life miserable." Be-
cause the stalker had communicated his intent, the specific intent re-
quirement was easily met. The statute would not, however, apply to sev-
eral other types of stalking behavior, such as where a stalker merely sends
flowers or notes professing love or devotion, 9° or, as was the case in Orsello,
where the stalker attributed his behavior to that of a loving husband trying
to "save his marriage and stay in contact with his family."
In conclusion, specific intent does not per se overcome a vagueness
challenge, as is evidenced by two decisions holding specific intent stalking
ings for a former partner or an attempt to rekindle the relationship.
The facts in State v. Orsello illustrate this point. See 529 N.W.2d 481, 483
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Diane and Paul Orsello were divorced in November,
1992. See id. at 482. In November of 1993, Diane charged Paul under Minne-
sota's stalking statute for a series of incidents dating back to June of that year. Af-
ter Diane pressed these charges, Paul's conduct intensified (Paul challenged Di-
ane to a fight, pulled out a gun in a case and said he "hoped it wouldn't go off,"
told Diane to "burn in hell," refused to discuss pick-up times when he took the
children, and left notes asserting that judges and social workers were manipulat-
ing Diane to break up his family.) See id. at 482-83. Paul admitted committing all
of the incidents alleged to be harassment, but characterized his behavior as that of
a loving husband and father seeking to reunite with his ex-wife and children. See
id. He characterized Diane as overly sensitive. See id. In his brief to the supreme
court appealing his conviction, Paul Orsello insisted that his "only shortcoming
[was] that he tried too hard and long to save his marriage and stay in contact with
his children." Petitioner's Brief at 7, Orsello (No. C2-94-1435).
This "domestic stalking" accounts for 80 percent of all stalking cases. See
Bjerregaard, supra note 16, at 308. This statistic is important for two reasons.
First, because this type of stalker is most likely to culminate his or her activity in
violence, a general intent requirement is necessary so these stalkers cannot avoid
prosecution by claiming they only intended to rekindle the romance. Secondly, if
200,000 people are stalked each year, see supra note 14 and accompanying text,
then a full 40,000 of those stalkers are delusional or borderline erotomaniacs, who
clearly do not have the intent to intimidate or frighten their victims. Since gen-
eral intent is the necessary standard to criminalize delusional and borderline er-
otomaniac's conduct, requiring a different intent level for a Former Intimate
stalker would create confusion and involve the courts and prosecutors in ad hoc
psychiatric analysis to determine the level of intent required for different stalkers.
88. See Faulkner & Hsiao, supra note 12, at 50-51 (maintaining that Califor-
nia's stalking statute is underinclusive for excluding more erotomaniacal conduct
than is necessary).
89. See People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
90. See supra note 13.
91. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Orsello (No. C2-94-1435); see also supra note 87.
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statutes unconstitutional for inadequately defining the underlying con-
duct.92 Specific intent statutes merely benefit from less exacting scrutiny
under a vagueness attack.9 s Minnesota's narrowly drawn act requirement
addresses the vagueness concerns regarding notice and enforcement.
9 4
Moreover, general intent statutes have withstood vagueness challenges;
general intent is the necessary standard to ensure the stalking statute pulls
within its scope all types of stalkers.9 5 However, even though the forego-
ing aspects of the amended stalking statute do not render it unconstitu-
tional, other aspects of the statute are constitutionally infirm. These are
discussed in Part IV(B) (1)-(2).
B. Displacing the Objective Standard
In addition to the amendment making Minnesota's stalking statute a
general intent crime, the legislature amended the definition of stalking.6
The statute interpreted by the court in Orsello defined the crime as "...
intentional conduct... that would cause a reasonable person under the circum-
stances to feel oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated and causes this reaction on
the part of the victim."9 7 The amended statute displaced the objective
reasonable person standard with a more subjective one, defining the
crime as "intentional conduct which the actor knows or has reason to
know would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened,
oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated and causes this reaction on the part of
the victim."98 Part IV(B)(1) will illustrate that removing the reasonable99
person element renders this statute unconstitutionally vague. Part
IV(B) (2) will illustrate that the new definition of the crime introduced
ambiguous language into the statute that may, de facto, negate the provi-
sion eliminating specific intent as an element 
of the crime.
1. The Subjective Standard is Unconstitutional
Twenty-four of the twenty-seven stalking statutes courts have inter-
preted under vagueness challenges incorporated a reasonable person
standard for interpreting the impact of the stalkers conduct on his or her
victim.10' Of the remaining three statutes, two were deemed unconstitu-
92. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
97. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 1(1) (2) (1996) (emphasis added).
98. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. 1(1)(2) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
99. See infra notes 101-128 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
101. This standard is manifested in twenty-three of the statutes by statutory
language criminalizing conduct "that would cause a reasonable person to feel..."
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tional for lacking an objective standard.'0 2 In contrast, Minnesota's statute
relies solely on the subjective "causes this reaction on the part of the vic-
tim" to determine if a person is guilty of stalking.10' In this respect, Min-
nesota's statute is unconstitutional for failing to specify a standard of con-
duct at all.'04
or that "would place a person in reasonable fear...." See ALA. CODE §§ 13-A-6-
90(a) (1992); CAL. PEN. CODE § 646.9(a) (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-
181d(a)(West 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504(b) (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§1312A(a) (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 784.048(3) (1992)(West Supp. 1998); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a) (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.3(a) (West 1996); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-5(b)(1)(B) (West 1997); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
508.140(1)(a)(2) (Michie 1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43(a) (West
1996); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.411h(1) (c) (d) (West 1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-220(1) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 12-10(a)(1) (West 1996); OKLA.
STAT. tit 21, § 1173(A)(1) (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.732(1)(b) (1995); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2709(b)(1) (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-2(a)(ii) (1994);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-19A-1(2) (Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
106.5(2)(a)(I-ii),(b)(I) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Michie 1996);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1)(b) (West 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
506(b) (Michie 1996). The twenty-fourth statute, Alaska's, does not expressly
contain an objective standard. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.270 (a) (Michie 1993).
However, the objective standard was imputed in Petersen, where the Alaska Court
of Appeals, quoting statutory language, held that "proof that a [stalker]
'recklessly' placed another person in fear of injury implicitly requires proof that
the victim's fear was reasonable." Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 431 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1996).
102. See generally Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); State
v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212 (Kan. 1996). The remaining statute, Ohio's, does not in-
corporate an objective standard and is the only statute lacking that standard that
has been upheld under a vagueness attack. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.211
(West 1995). In the case upholding that statute, however, the defendant did not
raise the First Amendment issue as applied to vagueness, and the court inter-
preted the statute against the due process provisions regarding notice and en-
forcement only. See Dayton, 646 N.E.2d at 919. The court's only mention of First
Amendment freedoms in its vagueness analysis intermingled overbreadth lan-
guage, declaring that the statute was aimed at harmful conduct that the state had
an interest in controlling. See id. See also Boychuk supra note 12, at 801 (asserting
that Ohio's statute is vague for lacking an objective standard against which to
measure the reaction of the victim).
103. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 subd. 1(1),(2) (Supp. 1997). This is not
meant to imply that this provision is per se unconstitutional. Most statutes require
that the victim suffer actual harm. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §1312A(a) ("...
and whose conduct induces such fear.. ."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
1173(A) (1992) (.... and [a]ctually causes the person ... to feel terrorized...").
Rather, the contention here is that this standard, as the sole determinant as to
whether activity is criminalized under the code, renders the statute unconstitu-
tional. See infra notes 105-28 and accompanying text.
104. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). Conduct that annoys
some people does not annoy others. See id. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not be-
cause it requires a person to conform his or her conduct to an imprecise stan-
dard, but rather because no standard of conduct is specified at all. See id.
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The primary impact of an objective standard on a statute's constitu-
tionality is that it removes constitutionally protected behavior from the
statute's ambit 1°5 by ensuring that only blameworthy behavior is pun-
ished.106 In Long, the court cited the absence of a reasonable person pro-
vision that would specify a more serious state of harm on the part of a vic-
tim than mere annoyance. 107 The court articulated the importance of
eliminating constitutionally protected behavior from a statute's scope, as-
serting that if the First Amendment activity is removed from the statute's
scope, then it can be examined under the more deferential due process
standards and is more likely to survive scrutiny.108
Jurisdictions upholding stalking statutes against vagueness attacks
explicitly recognize the role an objective standard plays in removing con-
stitutionally protected behavior from a statute's scope. In State v. Rangel,1°9
the Oregon Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute's requirement that
105. It is important to note that the provision in Minnesota's stalking statute
expressly removing constitutionally protected activity from the statute's scope, s'ee
supra note 33, while negating overbreadth challenges, does not automatically ne-
gate a vagueness challenge. See, e.g., Faulkner & Hsiao, supra note 12, at 26-27
(asserting that although courts treat overbreadth and vagueness together, it is
more analytically correct to say that statutes expressly exempting constitutionally
protected activity exchange overbreadth for vagueness). The authors therein
quote Professor Tribe, who illustrates the interplay between vagueness and over-
breadth with a hypothetical statute: "It shall be a crime to say anything in public
unless the speech is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments." Id. Tribe
notes that while this hypothetical statute is guaranteed not to be overbroad since
its terms forbid nothing the Constitution protects, the statute is nonetheless
"patently vague." See id. This is because it is unreasonable to expect citizens and
law enforcement officials to be constitutional scholars. See id. Therefore, while
the provision in Minnesota's stalking statute protecting constitutional activity may
overcome an overbreadth challenge, the statute may still be vulnerable to a
vagueness challenge if written so vaguely so as to infringe on First Amendment
freedoms. See also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
106. See Bjerregaard, supra note 16, at 320. The author cited decisions where
the reasonable person standard overcomes overbreadth challenges by narrowing
the scope of the statute and limiting its application only to blameworthy conduct.
See id. One of the principal difficulties with analyzing stalking statutes on vague-
ness grounds is that discussions on vagueness are often intertwined with over-
breadth. See Boychuk supra note 12, at 772; see also Bjerregaard, supra note 16, at
321 (opining that since vagueness and overbreadth analysis is often commingled
in court opinions, the exact basis for court's holdings are sometimes unclear).
However, because First Amendment considerations apply to the vagueness doc-
trine, the principal concern is whether the statute removes constitutionally pro-
tected behavior from its scope. See supra note 105 (asserting that First Amend-
ment concerns apply to vagueness, despite express statutory provision eliminating
constitutionally protected activity from its scope); see also supra notes 42-46 and
accompanying text (recounting that First Amendment concerns are the threshold
consideration in vagueness analysis).
107. See Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
108. See id. at 293; see also supra note 45-46 and accompanying text.
109. 934 P.2d at 1128 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
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harm be objectively reasonable paralleled another harassment statute and
focused on the harmful effect of speech, rather than speech itself In People v.111
White, the Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant's
claim that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on his First Amend-
ment right to free speech by permitting a victim to subjectively determine
which telephone calls are acceptable and which are criminal." 2 Instead,
the court reasoned that the statute criminalized conduct combined with
speech that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, threatened,
or harassed. 1 1 3 By ensuring that only blameworthy activity is proscribed,
the reasonable person standard negates the contention that a statute in-
fringes on free speech or association.
In addition to removing constitutionally protected activity from the
statute's reach, an objective standard also helps satisfy the due process
provision of the vagueness doctrine regarding notice and enforcement.
As for notice, the reasonable person standard ensures proscribed conduct
does not vary with the psychological makeup of the victim. 114 In State v.115
Bryan, the Supreme Court of Kansas held the 1994 version of that state's
stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague because it lacked an objective
standard for measuring when "following" harassed a victim." The court
determined this to be "dangerous" because it "subject[ed] the defendant.. . . .. . . . 117
to the particular sensibilities of the individual victim." The court rea-
soned that a defendant could be found guilty of stalking under the stat-
ute, even though a reasonable person in the same situation would not be
alarmed, annoyed, or harassed by the defendant's conduct."" By ensuring
the conduct proscribed does not vary with the particular psychological
110. See id. at 1130, 1132.
111. 536 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
112. See id. at 882.
113. See id. at 883.
114. See Woolfolk, 447 S.E.2d at 535; see also Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d at 1358,
1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (denying defendant's claim that statute's defini-
tion of "harass" subjects a stalker to conviction based on the "unusual sensitivities"
of his victim. The Court declared that the statute's reasonable person standard
negates this contention); Monhollen v. Com., 947 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Ky. Ct. App.
1997) (declaring that reasonable person standard ensures conduct is not deter-
mined by the victim's subjective feelings); Johnson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga.
1994) (holding that statute was not vague because a person of ordinary intelli-
gence could readily understand what action would provoke a reasonable fear of
harm).
115. 910 P.2d 212 (Kan. 1996).
116. Seeid. at 218,220.
117. See id. at 220. Different persons have different sensibilities, and conduct
which annoys or alarms one person may not annoy or alarm another. See id. The
victim may be of such a state of mind that conduct which would never annoy,
alarm, or harass a reasonable would seriously annoy, alarm or harass this victim.
See id.
118. See id. at 220.
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makeup of the victim, the objective standard protects citizens who engage
in non-threatening day-to-day contact with others from surprise prosecu-119
tions.
The reasonable person standard also protects a person against arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement. In Johnson, the court held the rea-
sonableness standard "provides a constraining and intelligible enforce-
ment standard for those charged with enforcing the statute.-"' A
reasonable fear element restrains law enforcement officers who investigate
reports of stalking from arbitrarily arresting an alleged stalker because
they have an objective baseline against which to evaluate the victim's
complaint.
121
The provision in Minnesota's statute requiring a stalker "know or
have reason to know" his or her conduct would cause a victim to feel op-
pressed 2 will not save the statute from vagueness.123 It is unreasonable to
require that a person "know or have reason to know" his or her activities
will cause this reaction in an unusually sensitive person. The provision,
without a reasonable person standard, could infringe on constitutionally
protected freedoms by leading citizens "to steer far wider of the unlawful
zone... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked. " 124 For example, any protester knows or has reason to know his
or her activity causes another to feel oppressed or persecuted; in fact, that
is the objective.
125
119. See Parker v. Commonwealth, 485 S.E.2d 150, 153-54 (Va. Ct. App. 1997);
see also Johnson, 449 S.E.2d at 96 (holding that the effect of the objective standard
is to remove those who only inadvertently make contact with another person).
120. Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. App. 1995); see also People v.
Holt, 649 N.E.2d 571, 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (asserting that the objective stan-
dard for the effect of the stalker's conduct on a victim avoids arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement).
121. See Parker, 485 S.E.2d 150 at 154; see also Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d
156, 162 (Ala. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting that statute's requirement that harassing
conduct be that which would cause a reasonable person harm prevents arbitrary
enforcement). See generally Boychuk, supra note 12, at 801 (stating that a statute
lacking a reasonable person standard for measuring a victim's reaction to the be-
havior leaves it to the discretion of the police and the victim to decide if the acts
constitute stalking).
122. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Faulkner & Hsiao, supra note 12, at 48 (providing the example
that repeated following would subject an abortion protester to arrest since, argua-
bly, the protester should know that the activity would cause reasonable fear in
light of violence sometimes associated with abortion issue). A minor twist on the
example illustrates the problem with basing arrest in Minnesota solely on the sub-
jective reaction of the person being protested. Despite Minnesota's statutory pro-
vision exempting constitutionally protected behavior, any protester, on any issue,
may avoid protesting activity if they know it harasses the person and arrest is based
solely on that person feeling distressed. Considering that citizens are not ex-
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Moreover, the subjective standard could result in the statute being
abused by alleged victims to rid themselves of people who merely aggra-
vate them, as in an acrimonious divorce. A parent who innocently wishes
to maintain contact with his or her children could be barred from doing
so, infringing on his or her constitutional right of association, if his or her
spouse is upset or unreasonably feels intimidated by his or her presence. A
spouse who is aware of his former mate's sensitivity and maintains contact
violates Minnesota's stalking statute as currently written.
Absent an objective standard for defining conduct criminalized un-
der the statute, not even the statute's listing of the activities constituting
stalking can save the statute from constitutional infirmity. Any of the
acts listed could conceivably infringe on First Amendment freedoms or
subject an individual to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement and sur-
prise prosecution if criminalization is based on the peculiar sensitivities of
the individual victim.
In conclusion, the reasonable person standard serves to remove con-
stitutionally protected behavior from the statute's scope by ensuring only
harmful conduct is criminalized. It also satisfies the due process vague-
ness concerns regarding notice and enforcement. Irrespective of how
narrowly drawn a statute's act requirement is, if these acts are criminalized
based solely on the peculiar sensitivities of a victim, the statute fails to
specify any standard of conduct at all. In his dissent in Orsello, Justice
Stringer correctly observed that the 1996 version of Minnesota's stalking
statute already had a "protective device" that would prevent an unwar-
127ranted application of the statute. That "device," he argued, was the re-
quirement that the proscribed conduct be of a nature to cause a reason-
able person to feel oppressed.
128
2. The Standard "Know or Have Reason to Know" is Ambigious
Minnesota's statutory requirement that the actor "knows or has rea-
son to know [his or her] conduct would cause the victim under the cir-
cumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or in-
timidated" is ambiguous in light of the statute's provision declaring that
pected to be constitutional scholars, see supra note 105, these people may none-
theless steer wider of the protected zone than if the applicability of the statute was
limited to an objective standard. With an objective standard, inevitably, a person's
occupation or rank in a business or other entity would be one of the circum-
stances weighed in determining whether a victim's reaction was reasonable.
126. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
127. See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 78 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissent-
ing).
128. See id.; see also State v. Lee, 917 P.2d 159, 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding that state's stalking statute against a vagueness challenge, the Court of
Appeals said that "the statute's reliance on an objective test precludes the conclu-
sion that it is unconstitutionally vague").
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the state need not prove specific intent. 2 9 This concern is grounded in
the legislature's listing terms and phrases used to establish intent as an
element of crimes in Minnesota and the supreme court's reasoning in Or-
sello.
The Minnesota legislature set forth guidelines as to how specific in-
tent is designated in a criminal statute.' One of the phrases establishing
specific intent is "some form of the verb 'know.'" Therefore, the
amended statute is ambiguous, because it contains language used to estab-
lish specific intent as well as an express provision eliminating the need to
prove specific intent.1
3 2
This is ironic considering the evolution of Minnesota's stalking stat-
ute as influenced by Orsello. In Orsello, the court proclaimed that a statute
lacking a clear statement of the level of intent required must be resolved
in favor of lenity toward a defendant and, in that case, to require specific
intent.3 3 Practically speaking, the statute's new requirement that a stalker
know his or her conduct is harassing may place stalking law in Minnesota
right back where it was after the Orsello decision. Although this concern
may seem unfounded given the legislature's specific language declaring
this crime a general intent crime, the legislature should feel compelled to
remove any and all ambiguity from this statute given the interpretive gym-
nastics the Orsello court was willing to undergo to find ambiguity where
there arguably was none.134
129. See MINN. STAT. § 609.749 subd. la. (Supp. 1997). In addition, requiring
a stalker to know his or her conduct oppresses or intimidates another is underin-
clusive for failing to recognize that many stalkers do not know their activity does
so. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
130. MINN. STAT. § 609.02 subd. 9 (1996). Minnesota's stalking statute states
that "[w] hen criminal intent is an element of a crime in this chapter, such intent
is indicated by the term 'intentionally', the phrase 'with intent to,' the phrase
'with intent that,' or some form of the verbs 'know' or 'believe'." Id. (emphasis
added).
131. See id. In addition, several jurisdictions interpreting stalking statutes de-
fining the crime with some form of the word "know" have imputed a specific in-
tent element in the respective statutes. In Range/ the Oregon Court of Appeals
interpreted that state's statute, criminalizing "knowingly" alarming behavior, to
require proof that the act and the alarm may be found in or implied from the
statute, despite the fact that the court recognized that the statute, as written, did
not require such proof. See State v. Rangel, 934 P.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Or. Ct. App.
1997); see also Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (
holding that the statute's requirement that a stalker "has knowledge or should
have knowledge" of the impact of his or her actions creates a specific intent re-
quirement).
132. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Stalking statutes have been enacted to address the recognition that
stalking, by both strangers and acquaintances, is a problem in society for
which the law provided insufficient remedies. 3 5 The overwhelmin& ma-
jority of these statutes have been upheld under constitutional attack.
The Minnesota Legislature's amendment clarifying the intent re-
quirement in Minnesota's stalking statute and establishing a general in-
tent crime does not render the statute vague and is supported by strong
policy considerations. 3 7 The legislature's narrow list of the acts constitut-
ing stalking satisfies the notice and enforcement provisions of the vague-
ness doctrine.'8 However, the legislature's removal of the reasonable per-
son standard for interpreting a victim's reaction to stalking activity renders
the statute unconstitutionally vague for pulling within its scope constitu-
tionally protected behavior and for failing to specify any standard of con-
duct at all.13 9 In addition, its requirement that a stalker "know" his or her
conduct will intimidate their victim may, de facto, nle ate the provision
eliminating specific intent as an element 
of this crime.
The legislature should amend the stalking statute's definition of the
crime by re-inserting the reasonable person standard and by eliminating
the requirement that a stalker know his or her conduct will intimidate the
victim. Doing so will eliminate the vagueness that makes the statute un-
constitutional and will remove any ambiguity that may allow the Supreme
Court to rule once again that this statute requires specific intent. The
resulting statute will: (1) protect victims from all types of stalkers, includ-
ing delusional perpetrators or those who simply claim their activity is mo-
tivated by romantic inclinations; (2) remove constitutionally protected
behavior from the statute's scope; (3) define the crime with sufficient clar-
ity so that a person of ordinary intelligence could understand the conduct
proscribed and to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement; and
(4) remove any ambiguity that could render the statute, in effect, a spe-
cific intent statute.
Brian L. McMahon
135. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 58-72, 79-91 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 101-28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 101-34 and accompanying text.
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